This article was written by Disha Chowdary, a student of School of law Christ University, Bangalore.
This paper describes the evolution of the Doctrine of Eclipse through judicial the pronouncements by exploring fundamental premises of it, and then digs into the contentious issue of extending its applicability to the post-Constitutional laws. Eminent jurists put themselves forward on opposing the extremes of the academic spectrum at this point, and all the contradictory judicial pronouncements just add up to the confusion. The author also submits that much of this paper has centered around if any distinction can be made between the laws which are void for lack of legislative competence and those which are void for violating constitutional limitations on the legislative power, and whether the word “void” in the Article 13(2) has to be in accordance with a meaning which is different from the meaning that is attached to it in Article 13(1); and it seeks to explore these controversies in an attempt to clarify the current legal position. Finally, the paper seeks to highlight one of the most crucial, yet, in India, often ignored features of this Doctrine, namely, its relevance as a tool for resolution of the Centre-State disputes under Articles 251 and 254, and to reflect on whether it has outlived its utility.
The phrase “Judicial Review” is defined as the imposition of judicial restraint on the legislative and the executive organs of the Government. It is the “overseeing by the judiciary of the exercise of powers by other co-ordinate organs of government with a view to ensuring that they remain confined to the limits drawn upon their powers by the Constitution.”  The concept has its origins in the theory of limited Government and the theory of two laws – the ordinary and the Supreme (i.e., the Constitution) – which entails that any act of the ordinary law-making bodies that contravenes the provisions of the Supreme Law must be void, and there must be some organ possessing the power or authority to pronounce such legislative acts void.
With the adoption of a written Constitution and the incorporation of Part III conferring Fundamental Rights therein, it was inevitable that the validity of all laws in India would be tested on the touchstone of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Constitution-makers included an explicit guarantee of the justiciability of fundamental rights in Article 13, which has been invoked on numerous occasions for declaring laws contravening them void. Courts have evolved various doctrines like the doctrines of severability, prospective overruling, and acquiescence, for the purposes of effecuating this Article. The Doctrine of Eclipse (“the Doctrine”) is one such principle, based on the premise that fundamental rights are prospective in nature. As a result of its operation, “an existing law inconsistent with a fundamental right, though it becomes inoperative from the date of commencement of the Constitution, is not dead altogether.” Hence, in essence, the Doctrine seeks to address the following quandary: If a law is declared null and void for infringing on a fundamental right, and then that fundamental right is itself amended such that the law is purged of any inconsistency with it, does the law necessarily have to be re-enacted afresh, or can it revive automatically from the date of the amendment? In other words, what is the precise nature of the operation of the Doctrine in the face of the general rule that a Statute void for unconstitutionality is non-est
and “notionally obliterated” from the Statute Book? Inherent in the application of the Doctrine to such questions is the predicament of conflicting priorities. What is to be determined here is whether, for the purpose of avoiding the administrative difficulties and expenditure involved in re-enacting a law, a law which was held void on the very sensitive and potent ground of violation of fundamental rights should, under special circumstances be permitted to revive automatically. This also raises some profound questions about legislative competence and the interference of courts in law making. These are the issues that this paper seeks to address. In doing so, the first part of this paper definitively traces the origin and fruition of the Doctrine through judicial pronouncements, by exploring its fundamental premises. The second part delves into the litigious issue of extending its applicability to post-Constitutional laws.
An extremely vital aspect of the Doctrine – which, in India, has thus far been largely overlooked by legal theorists and practitioners alike – is its crucial role in the federal framework. A survey of the principal federations in the Anglo American world shows that the Doctrine has been used primarily in cases where the enacting legislature undoubtedly had the power to enact a law, but the law was rendered inoperative because of supervening impossibilities, arising in the form of other incompatible laws enacted by legislatures having superior powers to enact such laws. A complete demarcation of powers between the federal and state spheres is neither feasible nor desirable in a federal polity. Necessarily, therefore, there must be provision for a sphere wherein concurrent powers are exercised by the federal and the state legislatures. It is in this area, that occasions for the use of the Doctrine have arisen. Since both legislatures undoubtedly have the competence to enact laws, in case both of them choose to exercise their powers, intriguing constitutional questions arise as to the status of the “lesser” State law. Is it rendered null and void, or does the possibility of its prospective revival subsist? Here, the Doctrine serves as a convenient mechanism for resolving potential Centre-State disputes, in the event of repugnancy between Central and State Acts. Drawing upon the analysis of the working of the Doctrine in the area of fundamental rights violations, this absorbing facet will also be examined in detail by the author in the final part of this paper.
In India, the Doctrine of Eclipse has been referred to, most frequently, in cases involving alleged violations of fundamental rights. Questions regarding the retrospectivity of these rights and the import of the word “void” in Article 13(1) of the Constitution, came up for deliberation in the leading case of Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, wherein a prosecution proceeding was initiated against the appellant under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, in respect of a pamphlet published in 1949. The present Constitution came into force during the pendency of the proceedings. The appellant pleaded that the impugned section of the 1931 Act was in contravention of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, and by virtue of Article 13(1), was void. Hence, it was argued that the proceedings against him could not be continued. This case raised several challenging issues with respect to the Doctrine, as analysed below.
(i) The Retrospectivity of Fundamental Rights
It is now well settled that the Constitution has no retrospective effect.  However, one of the basic questions related to the origin of the Doctrine of Eclipse that was raised in Keshavan, was whether fundamental rights are retrospective in operation. Article 13(1) provides that all pre-Constitutional laws, in so far as they are inconsistent with fundamental rights, are void. If fundamental rights are retrospective, then all pre-Constitutional laws inconsistent with fundamental rights must be void ab initio. On this point, in Keshavan, both Das and Mahajan, JJ., maintained that fundamental rights, including the freedom of speech and expression, were granted for the first time by the Constitution and that in September 1949, when proceedings were initiated, the appellant did not enjoy these rights. Hence, it was established that, as fundamental rights became operative only on, and from the date of the Constitution coming into force, the question of inconsistency of the existing laws with those rights must necessarily arise only on and from such date.
(ii) The Prospective Nature of Article 13(1)
Turning specifically to Article 13(1), the Court further held that every statute is prima facie
prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made retrospective. According to him, there was nothing in the language of Article 13(1), to suggest that there was an intention to give it retrospective operation. In fact, the Court was of the opinion that the
language clearly points the other way. It was therefore held that Article 13(1) can have no retrospective effect, but is wholly prospective in operation.” This interpretation has been upheld in subsequent cases.
(iii) Meaning and implication of “void” in Article 13(1)
In the Supreme Court, the majority, while maintaining that the proceedings under the impugned law could not be quashed, rejected the High Court’s view that the meaning of the word “void” in Article 13(1) amounts to “repeal” of the statute. It was held that the effect of Article 13 is quite different from the effect of the expiry of a temporary statute or its repeal by a subsequent statute. Article 13(1) only has the effect of nullifying or rendering all inconsistent existing laws ineffectual or nugatory and devoid of any legal binding force or effect, with respect to the exercise of fundamental rights, on and after the date of the Constitution’s commencement. According to Das J.:
Article 13(1) cannot be read as obliterating the entire operation of the inconsistent laws, or to wipe them out altogether from the statute book, for to do so will be to give them retrospective effect which, we have said, they do not possess. Such laws existfor all past transactions and for enforcing all rights and liabilities accrued before the date of the Constitution.
One of the earliest cases that dealt with the nexus between Article 13(1) and validation of pre-Constitutional laws infringing on fundamental rights was Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay.
In this case, the appellant was charged under Section 66(b), Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 for driving under the influence of alcohol. However, in an earlier case, State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, section 13(b), Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, was declared to be void so far as it affected the consumption or use of medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol,
as it was Violative of Article 19(1)(f). It was contended by the appellant in Behram, that since in Balsara the prohibition on possession and consumption of medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol was held to be invalid, therefore, section 66(b) was inoperative and unenforceable so far as such items were concerned. Therefore, the question to be considered in Behram, was the effect of the declaration in Balsara on the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. At the initial stage, the Supreme Court judges unanimously agreed that a declaration by a court that part of a section was invalid, did not repeal or amend that section, or add a proviso or exception to it, since repeal or amendment was a legislative function. This compelling constitutional question was, however, referred to a larger Bench, where Mahajan, C.J., held that the part of the section of an existing law which is unconstitutional is not law, and is null and void. It is notionally obliterated from the Statute book for the purposes of determining the rights and obligations of citizens. However, the same remains good law when a question arises for determination of rights and obligations incurred before 26 January, 1950. Das, J. dissented and was of the opinion that the effect of Balsara was that the prohibition contained in the relevant part of Section 13(b) would be ineffective against, and inapplicable to, a citizen who consumes or uses medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol. However, he was opposed to Mahajan, C.J.’s idea that, this part of the section can be taken to be notionally obliterated from the Statute book. The very basis of the Balsara declaration, according to him, was that a citizen has the fundamental right to possess or consume medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol. Hence, the onus is on the accused to prove that the section which has been declared void should not be applicable to him. If the accused is able to prove that he is a citizen, the Balsara decision will ensure that he is not punished. Authors like Seervai, have severely criticized the reasoning followed by Mahajan, C.J., because of his use of the term “notionally obliterated.” According to Seervai, if the view of the Court in Keshavan that the term “void” does not mean “repealed”, and that Article 13 cannot be read as obliterating the entire operation of inconsistent laws, is taken to be correct, then there is no scope for an unconstitutional provision to be “notionally obliterated.” Thus, according to Seervai, the dissenting judgment of Das, J. is the correct statement of the law.
The prospective nature of Article 13(1), and the limited connotation accorded to the word “void” in Keshavan, which was expounded by Das, J. In Behram, necessitated the
enunciation of the Doctrine of Eclipse in the leading case of Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh. In this case, the impugned provision allowed for the creation of a Government monopoly in the private transport business. After the coming into force of the Constitution, this provision became void for violating Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. However, Article 19(6) was amended in 1951, so as to permit State monopoly in business. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned Act, being void under Article 13(1), was dead and could not be revived by any subsequent amendment of the Constitution, but had to be re-enacted. This contention was rejected by a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, which laid down that after the amendment of Article 19(6) in 1951, the constitutional impediment was removed. The Act, therefore, ceased to be unconstitutional, and became Revivified and enforceable. The crux of the decision was the observation that an existing law inconsistent with a fundamental right, though inoperative from the date of commencement of the Constitution, is not dead altogether. According to some authors, it “is a good law if a question arises for determination of rights and obligations incurred before the commencement of the Constitution, and also for the determination of rights of persons who have not been given fundamental rights by the Constitution.” In this context, Das, C.J., held: The true position is that the impugned law became, as it were, eclipsed, for the time being, by the fundamental right. The effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 was to remove the shadow and to make the impugned Act free from all blemish or infirmity. He reiterated that such laws remained in force qua non-citizens, and it was only against the citizens that they remained in a dormant or moribund condition. This case was thus the foundation of the Doctrine, which has since been the subject of judicial contemplation in numerous decisions.
In the author’s opinion, three questions must be answered, in order to gauge the applicability of the Doctrine to post-Constitutional laws. First, can a post-Constitutional law be revived by a subsequent Constitutional amendment removing the Constitutional bar to its enforceability? Second, if a post Constitutional law violates rights conferred on citizens alone, (and thus becomes void qua them), does it remain valid and operative qua non-citizens like foreigners
and companies? Finally, can amending the Act in question so as to remove the blemish revive the law in question, or will it have to be re-enacted as a whole? This Part will examine each of these questions in detail. In Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P. a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court unanimously stated that the Doctrine could not applied to the impugned post Constitutional law. A legislation that contravened Article 19(1)(g) and was not protected by clause (6) of the Article, when it was enacted after the commencement of the Constitution, could not be validated even by subsequent Constitutional amendment.
However, the following observation of Das, C.J. in Bhikaji, has generated much perplexity on the issue: But apart from this distinction between pre-Constitution and post Constitution laws on which, however, we need not rest our decision, it must be held that these American authorities can have no application to our Constitution. All laws, existing or future, which are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of our Constitution are, by the express provision of Article 13, rendered void ‘to the extent of such inconsistency.’ Such laws were not dead for all purposes. They existed for the purpose of pre-Constitution rights and liabilities and they remained operative, even after the Constitution, as against non citizens.
The “American authorities” referred to in this case by the Supreme Court involved only post-Constitutional laws which were inconsistent with the provisions of the American Constitution, and which were held to be “still born”, as it were. Thus, these American rulings clearly could not apply to the case of pre Constitutional laws that were perfectly valid before the Constitution’s provisions took effect. Nevertheless, this observation has been used to contend that the Court has not drawn any distinction between pre- and post-Constitutional laws. The author submits, however, that in the latter part of the observation, the Court had in mind only the pre-Constitutional laws, otherwise it could not have stated that the laws existed for the purpose of pre-Constitutional rights and liabilities and that they remained operative even after the Constitution as against noncitizens.
In Deep Chand v. State of U.P. it was held that there is a clear distinction between the two clauses of Article 13. Under clause (1) a pre-Constitutional law subsists except to the extent
of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III, whereas as per clause (2), no post-Constitutional law can be made contravening the provisions of Part III and therefore the law to that extent, though made, is a nullity from its inception.
Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P. is the most authoritative decision for the impossibility of reviving post-Constitutional laws by a Constitutional amendment. The Court based its finding on the two grounds. First, the language and scope of Article 13(1) and 13(2) are different. Clause (1) clearly recognizes the existence of pre-Constitutional laws which were valid when enacted, and therefore could be revived by the Doctrine. Clause (2) on the other hand begins with an injunction to the State not to make a law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III. The legislative power of Parliament and State Legislatures under Article 245 is subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and therefore, subject to Article 13(2). Second, “contravention” takes place only once the law is made. This is because the contravention is of the prohibition to make any law, which takes away or abridges the fundamental rights. It is no argument to say that simply because the Amendment removes any subsequent scope for contravention, the law is no longer in conflict with the Constitution.
However, the scope of the principles established above stands drastically curtailed in view of the Supreme Court decision in State of Gujarat v. Shree Ambica Mills, wherein Matthew, J. held that like a pre-Constitutional law, a post Constitutional law contravening a fundamental right could also be valid in relation to those, whose rights were not infringed upon. For instance, when a post Constitutional law violates a fundamental right like Article 19 which is granted to citizens alone, it would remain valid in relation to non-citizens. Thus the term “void” in both the clauses of Article 13 makes a law only relatively void, and not absolutely void.
This judgment has been used to contend that the Doctrine has finally been extended to all post- Constitutional laws as well, since it recognizes that the law is not an absolute nullity and can operate against non-citizens. The author submits that this is not the correct proposition of law. It is evident that a law which abridges the rights of only citizens will
remain enforceable against non-citizens, and thus, there is no question of the Doctrine of Eclipse even entering the picture. However, as regards citizens whose rights were infringed, the law must be regarded as stillborn and void ab initio, and therefore, in order to make it apply to citizens, the law would have to re-enacted afresh.
From this arises the final question: When a post-Constitutional law is held inconsistent with a fundamental right, can it be revived by amending the Act in question so as to remove the blemish, or will it have to be re-enacted as a whole? The Delhi High Court in P.L. Mehra v. D.R. Khanna, has held that the legislation will have to be re-enacted and that it cannot be revived by mere amendment. This view appears to the author to emanate logically from the position adopted by the Supreme Court in treating such a law as void ab initio. There is,. therefore, no need to apply the Doctrine of Eclipse to post-Constitutional laws, as discussed above. There is no direct Supreme Court ruling on this point. The closest authority on this issue is Shama Rao v. State of Maharashtra, wherein an Act was challenged on the ground of excessive delegation, and pending the decision, the Legislature passed an Amendment Act seeking to remove the defect. The Supreme Court ruled by a majority that when an Act suffers from excessive delegation, it is stillborn and void ab initio. It cannot be revived by an amending Act seeking to remove the vice, and must be re-enacted as a whole. It is submitted that this ruling supports the proposition that an Act held invalid under Article 13(2) would not be revived merely by amending it, but would have to be re-enacted. Hence, we may safely infer that Ambica Mills does not destroy the force of the judicial pronouncements in Deep Chand and Mahendra Jaini, but merely limits the scope of their operation, and that the Doctrine, as of now, cannot be extended to post Constitutional laws.
The Doctrine of Eclipse exemplifies a subtle, nuanced aspect of the theory of Constitutionalism and the rule of law; and the fundamental distinction that it postulates between lawfulness and unlawfulness. It is used, in exceptional circumstances, to save unconstitutional statutes from being totally wiped off the statute book, and to merely render them dormant or inoperative for the time being. While ordinarily, a statute held unconstitutional cannot be revived except by re-enactment, a statute under eclipse is revived by obliteration of the limitations generating the taint of unconstitutionality.
The question of whether the Doctrine can be extended to revive post Constitutional laws as well, has engendered acrimonious debate among jurists and judges alike, and has also thrown up intriguing constitutional questions that beg for decisive judicial determination, such as the exact connotation of the word “void” in Article 13(1) and (2), and whether the American notion of “relatively void” is applicable to the Indian scenario. The fact of the matter is that there has been no unambiguous pronouncement by the Supreme Court on this issue following Ambica Mills, and thus far, the Doctrine of Eclipse has not been applied to post-Constitutional laws, a position with which the author is, as afore mentioned in this paper, inclined to agree.
It must be mentioned here that the Doctrine has been put to an entirely new use in our country, as compared to other Commonwealth jurisdictions. It has been extended far beyond the sphere of distribution of legislative power between the Centre and the States, and has been used as an instrument for harmonizing the pre-Constitutional legal order with the main dictates of the Constitution. It has become an important tool of judicial interpretation, and has
been applied to fields other than those contemplated by Article 13 as well – for example, in making a decree lying dormant executable, or determining the caste of a person who reconverts to Hinduism from another religion, or even to cases of rules, that is, subordinate legislation. However, this is certainly at the expense of virtually ignoring its most significant application in contemporary times, that is, in the realm of pre-empting Centre-State disputes under Articles 251 and 254. Common sense also yields the inevitable result that after more than 50 years of the adoption of the Constitution, a Doctrine focusing on the fate of pre-Constitutional laws in contravention of the fundamental rights, will ultimately be consigned to the depths of obscurity. Furthermore, the true scope and implications of its application in the area of federal relations has not been fully comprehended as yet. It is the author’s submission that, akin to the judiciary’s interpretation regarding the use of the Doctrine to revive post-Constitutional laws, it should be conclusively laid down that in case the concerned State Legislature did not possess the initial competence to pass a law due to the prior existence of a repugnant Central law, the impugned law is to be treated as stillborn and incapable of revival.
We have seen that the Doctrine underlines the crucial distinction between “lawfulness” and “unlawfulness” in the sphere of constitutional law. However, it should also be noted that part of the rationale behind its invocation appears to have been to avoid the administrative hassles and the wastage of time and resources necessarily incurred in re-enacting a law or issuing a law afresh, by simply allowing an existing law, rendered unenforceable due to its contravention of fundamental rights, to revive automatically. However, it is pertinent to mention at this juncture that concerns might validly arise about whether the Doctrine should continue to be applied or not. This is simply because the Doctrine automatically revives laws. So, for example, were the Union to amend the Constitution with a particular goal, it would revive all the prior laws that were in conflict with the unamended Constitution, and these laws would be revived without having to pass through the debate and scrutiny which any law being re-enacted ordinarily has to undergo.
However, the author is of the view that despite such apprehensions, the potential benefits of the Doctrine, including economizing on the Legislature’s time and expenditure, and, more
importantly, resolving Centre-State disputes that are almost sure to arise under Articles 251 and 254, outweigh the “costs” associated with it. It follows, therefore, that the Doctrine has not outlived its utility.
- Keshavan Madhava Menon v State of Bombay A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 128
- State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 318;
- Syed Qasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 156.
- Purshottam Govindji Halai v. B.M. Desai, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 20;
- Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 397.
- 6.Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 123.
- 7.State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 318.
- 8.Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh AI.R. 1955 S.C. 781
- Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 728.
- Deep Chand v. State of U.P A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 648.
- Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019.
- State of Gujarat v. Shree Ambica Mills A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1300.
- P.L. Mehra v. D.R. Khanna A.I.R. 1971 Del. 1.
- Shama Rao v. State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 480.
- Dularey Lodh v. III Additional District Judge, Kanpur, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1260.
- Kailash Sonkar v. Smt.Maya Devi, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 411.
- Muhammadbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1517.
- H.K. SAHARAYT, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: ANANALYTICAL APPROACH (2001).
- S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA (2002).
- M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2003).
- V.N. SHUKLA’S THE CONSTITUTIN OF INDIA (M.P. SINGH ed., 2001).
- P. RAMANATAHIYAR’S THE LAW LEXICON (JUSTICE Y.V. CHANDRACHUD ET AL. EDS., 2002).
- VENKATARAMAN, THE STATUS OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE, 2 J. IND. L. INST.(1960).
- COOLEY,A TREATISE ON THE CONS’ITIUTIONAL LIMITATION WHICH REST ‘UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES (1927).
- V.S.DESHPANDE, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION (1977).
 H.K. SAHARAYT, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: ANANALYTICAL APPROACH 57 (2001).
 S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA 1 (2002).
 M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1822-23 (2003).
 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950.
 V.N. SHUKLA’S THE CONSTITUTIN OF INDIA 29-32 (M.P. SINGH ed., 2001).
 P. RAMANATAHIYAR’S THE LAW LEXICON 585 (JUSTICE Y.V. CHANDRACHUD ET AL. EDS., 2002).
 VENKATARAMAN, THE STATUS OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE, 2 J. IND. L. INST.401 (1960).
 Keshavan Madhava Menon v State of Bombay A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 128
 State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 318; Syed Qasim Razvi v. State of
Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 156.
 Keshavan, supra note 8, at 130.
 Keshavan, supra note 8, at 130.
 Purshottam Govindji Halai v. B.M. Desai, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 20; Pannalal
Binjraj v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 397.
Keshavan, supra note 8.
 Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 123.
 State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 318.
 Behram, supra note 14.
 Behram, supra note 14.
 Seervai, supra note 16.
 Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh AI.R. 1955 S.C. 781.
 Bhikaji Narain Dhakras, id.
 Bhikaji Narain Dhakras, supra note 19
 Shukla, supra note 5,
 Bhikaji, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 781, 784-85.
 Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 728.
 COOLEY,A TREATISE ON THE CONS’ITIUTIONAL LIMITATION WHICH REST ‘UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES 201 (1927).
 Bhikaji, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 781, 783
 Seervai, supra note 16
 Deep Chand v. State of U.P A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 648.
Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1019.
 State of Gujarat v. Shree Ambica Mills A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1300.
 V.S.DESHPANDE, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION (1977).
P.L. Mehra v. D.R. Khanna A.I.R. 1971 Del. 1.
 Shama Rao v. State of Maharashtra A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 480.
 Seervai [SEERVAI, supra note 16], V.N. Shukla [SHUKLA, supra note 5] and T.K. Tope [TOPE,supra note 64] appear to be in favour of the revival of post-Constitutional laws by virtue of the Doctrine, whereas D.J. De [DE, supra note 75], M.P. Jain [JAIN,supra note 3], H.K. Saharay [SAHARAYsu,pra note 1] and D.D. Basu [BASU,supra note 67] have persuasively argued against it, citing the impossibility of reviving an Act which never had any valid existence.
 See, on the one hand, the decision of Matthew, J., in Shree Ambica Mills, AI.R. 1974 S.C. 1300, which has been used to argue in favour of the revival of post-Constitutional laws, and on the other hand, the decision in Mahendra Lal Jaini, AI.R. 1963 S.C. 109, which denies such a possibility. See also the majority judgment against the revival of post-Constitutional laws, in P.L. Mehra v. D.R. Khanna, AI.R. 1970 Del. 1, and the dissenting opinion of V.N. Deshpande, J.
 Dularey Lodh v. III Additional District Judge, Kanpur, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1260.
 Kailash Sonkar v. Smt.Maya Devi, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 411.
 Muhammadbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1517.