Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala: The verdict that changed the face of Indian democracy

 

THIS ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN BY HARSHITA TOMAR, A STUDENT OF  HIDAYATULLAH NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY ,NEW RAIPUR.

Abstract

The debate on the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution, lying somnolent in the documents of India’s protected history amid the most recent decade of the twentieth century, has returned in general society domain. As per the Constitution, Parliament and the state councils in India have the ability to make laws inside their separate purviews. This force is not outright in nature. The Constitution vests in the legal, the ability to mediate upon the sacred legitimacy of all laws. In the event that a law made by Parliament or the state governing bodies disregards any arrangement of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the ability to pronounce such a law invalid or ultra vires. This check in any case, the establishing fathers needed the Constitution to be a versatile archive as opposed to an inflexible system for administration. Consequently Parliament was contributed with the ability to alter the Constitution.

 Article 368 of the Constitution gives the feeling that Parliament’s changing forces are supreme and include all parts of the archive. Be that as it may, the Supreme Court has gone about as a brake to the authoritative excitement of Parliament as far back as freedom. With the goal of protecting the first beliefs imagined by the constitution-producers, the summit court purported that Parliament couldn’t misshape harm or change the fundamental elements of the Constitution under the affection of correcting it. The expression ‘essential structure’ itself can’t be found in the Constitution. The Supreme Court remembered this idea without precedent for the noteworthy Kesavananda Bharati case in 1973.

As far back as the Supreme Court has been the translator of the Constitution and the authority of all alterations made by Parliament. Precisely forty two years prior, on April 24, 1973, Chief Justice Sikri and 12 judges of the Supreme Court collected to convey the most critical judgment in its history. The instance of Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala had been heard for 68 days, the contentions initiating on October 31, 1972, and finishing on March 23, 1973. The diligent work and grant that had gone into the planning of this case was amazing. Actually several cases had been refered to and the then Attorney-General had made a similar outline examining the arrangements of the Constitutions of 71 distinct nations! All the efforts in this essay would be made to answer just one main question: was the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution unlimited? In other words, could Parliament alter, amend, abrogate any part of the Constitution even to the extent of taking away all fundamental rights?

The pre-Kesavanada position

Parliament’s power to change the Constitution, especially the chapter on the fundamental rightsof citizens, was challenged as early as in 1951. After independence, a few laws were authorized in the states with the point of changing area proprietorship and occupancy structures. This was with regards to the decision Congress gathering’s appointive guarantee of actualizing the communist objectives of the Constitution [contained in Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Directive Principles of State Policy] that required equitable distribution of resources of creation among all citizens and avoidance of convergence of riches in the hands of a couple. Property proprietors – unfavourably influenced by these laws – appealed to the courts. The courts struck down the land changes laws saying that they transgressed the principal appropriate to property ensured by the Constitution. Provoked by the horrible judgements, Parliament put these laws in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution through the First and Fourth amendments (1951 and 1952 respectively), consequently adequately expelling them from the extent of legal survey.

[Parliament added the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution through the principal correction in 1951 as a method for inoculating certain laws against legal survey. Under the arrangements of Article 31, which themselves were corrected a few circumstances later, laws put in the Ninth Schedule – relating. To obtaining of private property and pay payable for such securing – can’t be tested in a courtroom on the ground that they disregarded the principal privileges of nationals. This defensive umbrella covers more than 250 laws go by state lawmaking bodies with the point of controlling the span of land possessions and cancelling different tenure frameworks. The Ninth Schedule was made with the essential target of keeping the legal – which maintained the natives’ entitlement to property on a few events – from wrecking the Congress party drove government’s plan for a social revolution.]

Property proprietors again tested the sacred changes which put arrive changes laws in the Ninth Schedule under the watchful eye of the Supreme Court, saying that they abused Article 13 (2) of the Constitution.

Article 13 (2) accommodates the insurance of the fundamental rights of the subject. Parliament and the state councils are obviously denied from making laws that may take away or abbreviate the key rights ensured to the subject. They contended that any change to the Constitution had the status of a law as comprehended by Article 13 (2). In 1952 (Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India[1] ) and 1955 (Sajjan Singh v. Rajasthan[2]), the Supreme Court rejected both contentions and maintained the force of Parliament to alter any part of the Constitution including what influences the essential privileges of nationals. Altogether however, two disagreeing judges in Sajjan Singh v. Rajasthan[3] case raised questions whether the fundamental rights of citizens could become a plaything of the majority party in Parliament.

The Golaknath verdict

In 1967 an eleven-judge bench of the Supreme Court switched its position. Conveying its 6:5 majority judgment in the Golaknath v. Condition of Punjab case, Chief Justice Subba Rao set forth the inquisitive position that Article 368, that contained arrangements identified with the change of the Constitution, simply set out the revising system. Article 368 did not present upon Parliament the ability to correct the Constitution. The correcting power (constituent power) of Parliament emerged from different arrangements contained in the Constitution (Articles 245, 246, 248) which gave it the ability to make laws (whole administrative power). Along these lines, the peak court held that the correcting power and authoritative forces of Parliament were basically the same. Consequently, any correction of the Constitution must be esteemed law as comprehended in Article 13 (2).

The lion’s share judgment summoned the idea of inferred restrictions on Parliament’s energy to correct the Constitution. This view held that the Constitution gives a position of changelessness to the basic opportunities of the resident. In giving the Constitution to themselves, the general population had saved the key rights for themselves. Article 13, as indicated by the larger part see, communicated this constraint on the forces of Parliament. Parliament couldn’t alter, limit or weaken major opportunities because of this very plan of the Constitution and the way of the flexibilities conceded under it. The judges expressed that the key rights were so hallowed and supernatural in significance that they couldn’t be confined regardless of the possibility that such a move were to get consistent endorsement of both places of Parliament. They watched that a Constituent Assembly may be summoned by Parliament with the end goal of correcting the essential rights if vital.

At the end of the day, the pinnacle court held that a few components of the Constitution lay at its center and required considerably more than the typical techniques to change them.

The expression ‘basic structure’ was presented surprisingly by M.K. Nambiar and different insight while contending for the applicants in the Golaknath case, yet it was just in 1973 that the idea surfaced in the content of the zenith court’s decision.

[Parliament added the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution through the primary alteration in 1951 as a method for inoculating certain laws against legal survey. Under the arrangements of Article 31, which themselves were altered a few circumstances later, laws put in the Ninth Schedule – relating. to securing of private property and remuneration payable for such procurement – can’t be tested in a courtroom on the ground that they disregarded the basic privileges of natives. This defensive umbrella covers more than 250 laws go by state governing bodies with the point of managing the extent of land property and nullifying different tenure frameworks. The Ninth Schedule was made with the essential goal of keeping the legal – which maintained the nationals’ entitlement to property on a few events – from wrecking the Congress party drove government’s plan for a social revolution.] Property proprietors again tested the protected alterations which set land changes laws in the Ninth Schedule under the watchful eye of the Supreme Court, saying that they damaged Article 13 (2) of the Constitution.

Article 13 (2) accommodates the assurance of the central privileges of the subject. Parliament and the state lawmaking bodies are unmistakably disallowed from making laws that may take away or condense the crucial rights ensured to the resident. They contended that any change to the Constitution had the status of a law as comprehended by Article 13 (2). In 1952 (Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India ) and 1955 (Sajjan Singh v. Rajasthan ), the Supreme Court rejected both contentions and maintained the force of Parliament to revise any part of the Constitution including what influences the crucial privileges of subjects. Essentially however, two contradicting judges in Sajjan Singh v. Rajasthan case raised questions whether the key privileges of natives could turn into a toy of the dominant part party in Parliament.

Nationalization of Banks and Abolition of Privy Purses

Inside a couple of weeks of the Golaknath decision the Congress party endured substantial misfortunes in the parliamentary races and lost influence in a few states. In spite of the fact that a private part’s bill – tabled by Barrister Nath Pai – trying to re-establish the matchless quality of Parliament’s energy to change the Constitution was presented and talked about both on the floor of the house and in the Select Committee, it couldn’t be passed because of political impulses of the time. In any case, the chance to test parliamentary matchless quality introduced itself at the end of the day when Parliament acquainted laws with give more prominent access to bank credit for the horticultural area and guarantee even-handed appropriation of riches and assets of generation and by:

1. a) Nationalizing banks and
2. b) derecognising recent rulers in an offer to take away their Privy totes, which were guaranteed in ceaselessness – as a sop to agree to the Union – at the season of India’s autonomy.

Parliament contemplated that it was executing the Directive Principles of State Policy however the Supreme Court struck down both moves. At this point, obviously the Supreme Court and Parliament were at loggerheads over the relative position of the major rights versus the Directive Principles of State Policy. At one level, the fight was about the amusingness of Parliament opposite the force of the courts to decipher and maintain the Constitution.

At another level the dispute was over the holiness of property as a principal right desirously monitored by a princely class much littler than that of the expansive ruined masses for whose advantage the Congress government asserted to actualize its communist improvement program.

Less than two weeks after the Supreme Court struck down the President’s request derecognising the rulers, in a fast move to secure the command of the general population and to reinforce her own stature Prime Minister Indira Gandhi broke up the Lok Sabha and called a snap survey.

Surprisingly, the Constitution itself turned into the constituent issue in India. Eight of the ten declarations in the 1971 races called for changes in the Constitution keeping in mind the end goal to reestablish the matchless quality of Parliament. A.K. Gopalan of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) went to the degree of saying that the Constitution be discarded the whole ball of wax and be supplanted with one that cherished the genuine sway of the general population .The Congress party came back to control with a 66% lion’s share. The electorate hosted supported the Congress get-together’s communist motivation, which in addition to other things discussed rolling out essential improvements to the Constitution keeping in mind the end goal to re-establish Parliament’s matchless quality.

Through a spate of amendments made between July 1971 and June 1972 Parliament sought to regain lost ground.  It restored for itself the absolute power to amend any part of the Constitution including Part III, dealing with fundamental rights. [4]Even the President was made duty bound to give his assent to any amendment bill passed by both houses of Parliament.  Several curbs on the right property were passed into law.  The right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws  (Article 14) and the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under  Article 19 were made subordinate to Article 39  (b) & (c) in the Directive Principles of State Policy[5].Privy purses of erstwhile princes were abolished and an entire category of legislation dealing with land reforms was placed in the Ninth Schedule beyond the scope of judicial review.[6]

Development of the Basic Structure Concept-the Kesavanada breakthrough

Unavoidably, the protected legitimacy of these revisions was tested before a full seat of the Supreme Court (thirteen judges). Their decision can be found in eleven separate judgements. Nine judges marked a rundown explanation which records the most imperative conclusions came to by them for this situation. Granville Austin takes note of that there are a few errors between the focuses contained in the synopsis marked by the judges and the suppositions communicated by them in their different judgements. By and by, the fundamental idea of ‘essential structure’ of the Constitution picked up acknowledgment in the greater part decision.

All judges maintained the legitimacy of the Twenty-fourth amendment saying that Parliament had the ability to alter any or all arrangements of the Constitution. All signatories to the outline held that the Golaknath case had been chosen wrongly and that Article 368 contained both the power and the methodology for correcting the Constitution.

Be that as it may they were obvious that a correction to the Constitution was not the same as a law as comprehended by Article 13 (2).

[It is important to bring up the unobtrusive contrast that exists between two sorts of capacities performed by the Indian Parliament:

1. a) it can make laws for the nation by practicing its administrative power and
2. b) it can revise the Constitution by practicing its constituent power.

Constituent power is better than common administrative power. Dissimilar to the British Parliament which is a sovereign body (without a composed constitution), the forces and elements of the Indian Parliament and State assemblies are liable to confinements set down in the Constitution. The Constitution does not contain every one of the laws that oversee the nation. Parliament and the state governing bodies make laws every now and then on different subjects, inside their separate wards. The general system for making these laws is given by the Constitution. Parliament alone is given the ability to roll out improvements to this structure under Article 368.Unlike common laws, revisions to established arrangements require an extraordinary lion’s share vote in Parliament.

Another delineation is valuable to exhibit the contrast between Parliament’s constituent power and law making powers. As indicated by Article 21 of the Constitution, no individual in the nation might be denied of his life or individual freedom with the exception of as per method set up by law. The Constitution does not set out the subtle elements of the system as that duty is vested with the assemblies and the official. Parliament and the state governing bodies make the essential laws recognizing hostile exercises for which a man might be detained or sentenced to death. The official sets out the methodology of actualizing these laws and the denounced individual is attempted in a courtroom. Changes to these laws might be joined by a basic larger part vote in the concerned state governing body. There is no compelling reason to alter the Constitution keeping in mind the end goal to consolidate changes to these laws. Be that as it may, if there is a request to change over Article 21 into the essential ideal to life by abrogating capital punishment, the Constitution may must be appropriately corrected by Parliament utilizing its constituent power.

In particular seven of the thirteen judges in the Kesavananda Bharati case, including Chief Justice Sikri who marked the outline articulation, pronounced that Parliament’s constituent power was liable to characteristic constraints. Parliament couldn’t utilize its correcting powers under Article 368 to ‘harm’, ‘weaken’, ‘wreck’, ‘revoke’, “change” or “adjust” the ‘essential structure’ or system of the Constitution.

Basic Features of the Constitution as indicated by the Kesavanada decision

Every judge laid out independently, what he believed were the fundamental or basic elements of the Constitution. There was no unanimity of sentiment inside the lion’s share see either.

Sikri, C.J. clarified that the idea of fundamental structure included:

• matchless quality of the Constitution
• republican and vote based type of government
• mainstream character of the Constitution
• detachment of forces between the governing body, official and the legal
• government character of the Constitution

Shelat, J. furthermore, Grover, J. added two more fundamental components to this rundown:

• the command to manufacture a welfare state contained in the Directive Principles of State Policy
• solidarity and uprightness of the country

Hegde, J. also, Mukherjea, J. recognized a different and shorter rundown of essential elements:

• sway of India
• fair character of the country
• solidarity of the nation
• fundamental components of the individual flexibilities secured to the nationals
• command to manufacture a welfare state

Jaganmohan Reddy, J. expressed that components of the essential elements were to be found in the Preamble of the Constitution and the arrangements into which they interpreted, for example,

• sovereign popularity based republic
• parliamentary majority rules system
• three organs of the State

He said that the Constitution would not act naturally without the essential opportunities and the order standards

Only six judges on the seat (in this manner a minority see) concurred that the central privileges of the native had a place with the fundamental structure and Parliament couldn’t correct.

The minority view

The minority see conveyed by Justice A.N. Beam (whose arrangement to the position of Chief Justice far beyond the heads of three senior judges, not long after the elocution of the Kesavananda decision, was generally thought to be politically persuaded), Justice M.H. Ask, Justice K.K. Mathew and Justice S.N. Dwivedi additionally concurred that Golaknath had been chosen wrongly. They maintained the legitimacy of every one of the three alterations tested under the steady gaze of the court. Beam, J. held that all parts of the Constitution were basic and no qualification could be made between its basic and unimportant parts. Every one of them concurred that Parliament could roll out major improvements in the Constitution by practicing its energy under Article 368.

In outline the greater part decision in Kesavananda Bharati perceived the force of Parliament to correct any or all arrangements of the Constitution gave such a demonstration did not demolish its fundamental structure. Yet, there was no unanimity of supposition about what selects to that essential structure. In spite of the fact that the Supreme Court practically came back to the position of Sankari Prasad (1952) by reestablishing the matchless quality of Parliament’s altering power, basically it reinforced the force of legal survey substantially more.

Basic Structure idea reaffirmed-the Indira Gandhi Election case

In 1975, The Supreme Court again had the chance to maintain on the fundamental structure of the Constitution. A test to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s race triumph was maintained by the Allahabad High Court on grounds of appointive misbehavior in 1975. Pending interest, the get-away judge-Justice Krishna Iyer, conceded a stay that permitted Smt. Indira Gandhi to work as Prime Minister on the condition that she ought not draw a pay and talk or vote in Parliament until the case was chosen. In the interim, Parliament passed the Thirty-ninth correction to the Constitution which expelled the power of the Supreme Court to mediate petitions in regards to decisions of the President, Vice President, Prime Minister and Speaker of the Lok Sabha. Rather, a body constituted by Parliament would be vested with the ability to determine such decision debate. Segment 4 of the Amendment Bill successfully frustrated any endeavor to challenge the decision of an officeholder, possessing any of the above workplaces in an official courtroom. This was obviously a pre-emptive activity intended to profit Smt. Indira Gandhi whose race was the question of the progressing debate.

Corrections were likewise made to the Representation of Peoples Acts of 1951 and 1974 and put in the Ninth Schedule alongside the Election Laws Amendment Act, 1975 keeping in mind the end goal to spare the Prime Minister from embarassment if the summit court conveyed a troublesome decision. The mala fide aim of the legislature was demonstrated by the scurry in which the Thirty-ninth alteration was passed. The bill was presented on August 7, 1975 and go by the Lok Sabha that day. The Rajya Sabha (Upper House or House of Elders) passed it the following day and the President gave his consent two days after the fact. The correction was sanctioned by the state governing bodies in extraordinary Saturday sessions. It was gazetted on August 10. At the point when the Supreme Court opened the case for listening to the following day, the Attorney General requested that the Court toss out the case in the light of the new correction.

Direct for Raj Narain who was the political rival testing Mrs. Gandhi’s decision contended that the correction was against the essential structure of the Constitution as it influenced the lead of free and reasonable races and the force of legal audit. Advise additionally contended that Parliament was not equipped to utilize its constituent power for approving a race that was pronounced void by the High Court.

Four out of five judges on the seat maintained the Thirty-ninth alteration, however simply in the wake of striking down that part which looked to control the force of the legal to mediate in the ebb and flow race dispute.One judge, Beg, J. maintained the correction completely. Mrs. Gandhi’s decision was proclaimed substantial on the premise of the changed race laws. The judges grudgingly acknowledged Parliament’s energy to pass laws that have a review impact.

The Kesavananda Review Bench

Inside three days of the choice on the Election case Ray, C.J. met a thirteen judge seat to audit the Kesavanada decision on the appearance of listening to various petitions identifying with land roof laws which had been grieving in high courts. The petitions battled that the use of land roof laws disregarded the fundamental structure of the Constitution. Essentially the Review seat was to choose whether or not the fundamental structure regulation confined Parliament’s energy to correct the Constitution. The choice in the Bank Nationalization case was likewise up for audit.

In the mean time Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, in a discourse in Parliament, declined to acknowledge the creed of fundamental structure .

It must be recollected that no particular request of looking for an audit of the Kesavananda decision recorded under the watchful eye of the zenith court-a reality noted with much embarrassment by a few individuals from the seat. N.N. Palkhivala showing up for a coal mining organization smoothly contended against the move to survey the Kesavananda choice. At last, Ray, C.J. disintegrated the seat following two days of hearings. Many individuals have suspected the administration’s roundabout inclusion in this scene trying to fix a troublesome legal point of reference set by the Kesavananda choice. However no coordinated endeavors were made to seek after the case.

The assertion of a National Emergency in June 1975 and the ensuing suspension of crucial opportunities, including the privilege to move courts against preventive detainment, redirected the consideration of the nation from this issue.

Sardar Swaran Singh Committee and the Forty-second Amendment

Not long after the assertion of National Emergency, the Congress party constituted a panel under the Chairmanship of Sardar Swaran Singh to concentrate the topic of revising the Constitution in the light of past encounters. In light of its suggestions, the legislature fused a few changes to the Constitution including the Preamble, through the Forty-second alteration (go in 1976 and became effective on January 3, 1977). In addition to other things the alteration:

1. a) gave the Directive Principles of State Policy priority over the Fundamental Rights contained in Article 14 (appropriate to correspondence under the watchful eye of the law and equivalent assurance of the laws), Article 19 (different flexibilities like the right to speak freely and expression, ideal to amass gently, ideal to shape affiliations and unions, ideal to move about and live unreservedly in any part of the nation and the privilege to seek after any exchange or calling) and Article 21 (ideal to life and individual freedom). Article 31C was corrected to restrict any test to laws made under any of the Directive Principles of State Policy;
2. b) set out that corrections to the Constitution made in the past or those liable to be made in future couldn’t be addressed in any court on any ground;
3. c) expelled all revisions to central rights from the extent of legal survey and
4. d) evacuated all points of confinement on Parliament’s energy to correct the Constitution under Article 368.

The Minerva Mills and Waman Rao cases

Within less than two years of the restoration of Parliament’s amending powers to near absolute terms, the Forty-second amendment was challenged before the Supreme Court by the owners of Minerva Mills (Bangalore) a sick industrial firm which was nationalised by the government in 1974.[7]

Mr. N.A. Palkhivala, famous protected legal advisor and direction for the applicants, picked not to challenge the administration’s activity just as far as an encroachment of the central appropriate to property. Rather, he confined the test as far as Parliament’s energy to alter the Constitution.

Mr. Palkhivala contended that Section 55 of the alteration had put boundless changing force in the hands of Parliament. The endeavor to vaccinate protected alterations against legal survey abused the tenet of fundamental structure which had been perceived by the Supreme Court in the Kesavananda Bharati and Indira Gandhi Election Cases. He additionally fought that the altered Article 31C was intrinsically awful as it damaged the Preamble of the Constitution and the essential privileges of residents. It likewise took away the force of legal survey.

Boss Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, conveying the dominant part judgment (4:1), maintained both conflicts. The larger part see maintained the force of legal survey of protected alterations. They kept up that provisos (4) and (5) of Article 368 gave boundless power on Parliament to revise the Constitution. They said this denied courts of the capacity to scrutinize the revision regardless of the possibility that it harmed or pulverized the Constitution’s fundamental structure.

The judges, who agreed with Chandrachud, C.J. decided that a restricted changing force itself is a fundamental element of the Constitution.

Bhagwati, J. the disagreeing judge additionally concurred with this view expressing that no power howsoever grand, could case to be the sole judge of its energy and activities under the Constitution.

The larger part held the alteration to Article 31C unlawful as it demolished the amicability and harmony between crucial rights and mandate standards which is a fundamental or essential component of the Constitution. The amendment to Article 31C remains a dead letter as it has not been canceled or erased by Parliament. By and by cases under it are chosen as it existed before the Forty-second amendment.

For another situation identifying with a comparable debate including agrarian property the peak court, held that every single protected correction made after the date of the Kesavananda Bharati judgment were interested in legal review.All laws set in the Ninth Schedule after the date of the Kesavananda Bharati judgment were likewise open to survey in the courts. They can be tested on the ground that they are past Parliament’s constituent power or that they have harmed the fundamental structure of the Constitution. Fundamentally, the Supreme Court struck a harmony between its power to decipher the Constitution and Parliament’s energy to correct it.

Conclusion:

It might be said that the last word on the issue of the essential structure of the Constitution has not been proclaimed by the Supreme Court-a situation that is probably not going to change sooner rather than later. In the event that most of the Supreme Court had held (as six judges in fact did) that Parliament could change any part of the Constitution, India would unquestionably have declined into a totalitarian State or had one-party run the show. At any rate, the Constitution would have lost its matchless quality. Indeed, even Seervai later conceded that the fundamental structure hypothesis saved Indian vote based system. One needs to just look at the revisions that were made amid the Emergency. The 39th Amendment denied any test to the decision of the President, Vice-President, Speaker and Prime Minister, regardless of the discretionary misbehavior. This was an unmistakable endeavor to invalidate the unfriendly Allahabad High Court administering against Indira Gandhi. The 41st Amendment disallowed any case, common or criminal, being recorded against the President, Vice-President, Prime Minister or the Governors, amid their term of office as well as for eternity. In this manner, if a man was a representative for only one day, he gained invulnerability from any legitimate procedures forever. In the event that Parliament were for sure incomparable, these stunning revisions would have gotten to be a piece of the Constitution. . One conviction that developed out of this tussle amongst Parliament and the legal is that all laws and sacred changes are presently subject to legal audit and laws that transgress the fundamental structure are probably going to be struck around the Supreme Court. Fundamentally Parliament’s energy to correct the Constitution is not total and the Supreme Court is the last referee over and translator of every single established alteration

Because of Kesavananda Bharati, Palkhivala and the seven judges who were in the lion’s share, India keeps on being the world’s biggest popular government. The souls of Nehru, Patel, Ambedkar and all the establishing fathers of our Constitution can truly rest in peace.

[1]  Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458

[2] Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845.

[3] Supra Note 2

[4] The Constitution (Twenty-fourth amendment) Act 1971.

[5] The Constitution (Twenty-fifth amendment) Act 1971.

[6] The Constitution (Twenty-sixth amendment) Act 1971 and The Constitution (Twenty-ninth amendment) Act 1972,

respectively

[7] Minerva Mills Ltd. v Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625.